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T H E O R I E S  
Ownership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Duan Bilandi noted in 
December 1991, had been on the agenda since 1878. Occupied by Austria 
until the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918, the Kara	or	evi dynasty then 
gerrymandered it, first to guarantee Serbian majorities, then to defuse 
tensions between Croats and Serbs by partitioning the region between 
them. Under Tito, Bosnia-Herzegovina again became a unified polity, but 
as a buffer between Croatia and Serbia it was controlled by the central 
government from its formal resurrection in 1943 through the mid 1960s.1 
Yet the turbulence of its recent history has not deterred many 
observers from insisting that Bosnia-Herzegovina had been a species of 
multicultural paradise. Why they did so is not clear. One explanation, 
excluding rank partisanship and simple dishonesty, is that scholars, 
politicians, and diplomats, like journalists, also move in packs, and so 
they notice only what the pack notices and conveniently forget where the 
pack has been. Another is what a colleague calls “the American fallacy,” 
which insists that scholars credit only the new, embracing the latest study 
or theory as relevant, if not true, and rejecting all earlier studies and 
theories as obsolete. A third is that, just as Sovietologists failed to predict 
the demise of the USSR and jettisoned earlier theories in favor of those 
which seemed to fit the new era, so did Yugoslav specialists scramble to 
find new theories to replace their earlier work.  
But there were few Yugoslav specialists, so most commentators during 
the early 1990s were recent arrivals to the region and, like “parachute 
journalists,” their knowledge of its history and politics was sketchy. 
Most observers had limited access to information and many of them 
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tailored the available information to fit their models or conform to policy 
imperatives. Finally, there was what might be termed the “Sarajevo effect.” 
Demographically, Bosnia’s capital was Muslim and Yugoslav, in much the 
same way that Belgrade was Serbian. In the city’s center, Muslims and 
Yugoslavs accounted for two-thirds of the population. Yugoslavs were 
almost three times as likely to live in large urban areas as in towns and 
villages; one in twelve Bosnian Yugoslavs lived in Sarajevo.2 Just as the 
Serbian population in Belgrade tended to expose diplomats and 
journalists to Serbian culture and opinions to the exclusion of those of 
other nationalities, the Muslim and Yugoslav populations in Sarajevo 
seem to have had a similar effect on foreign observers between 1991 and 
1995. The resulting image of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and of the relationship 
which Croatia and Serbia had to it, tended to be simple, incomplete, and 
misleading. 
 
* * * 
Most observers agree that between 1992 and 1995 the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina involved three distinct but overlapping phases, one which 
pitted Croatian and Muslim forces against Serbian forces, another which 
saw Muslims and Croats fight each other as Serbian forces sought to 
consolidate and extend their earlier gains, and a third which found 
Croatian and Muslim armies again united against Serbian forces, this time 
with the support of members of the international community.3 But why 
Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered such a violent disintegration remains a 
subject for debate. Some observers have discerned trends favoring the 
emergence of a cosmopolitan polity in the unfortunate republic.4 Others 
believe Bosnia-Herzegovina rests on a civilizational fault line, its history 
characterized by religious separatism and political intolerance. It is also 
possible to see the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of the 
countryside against the city.5 Some, like Naza Tanovi-Miller, argue that 
Bosnia’s problems were caused by outsiders like Radovan Karadi, who 
was “not a real Bosnian,” but a Montenegrin “from a family of Chetniks” 
which had a “murderous past.”6 Locating the causes of the conflict in 
Belgrade and Zagreb rather than Sarajevo, as she did, exempted the 
Bosnian government from responsibility for the chaos which befell the 
former Yugoslav republic and laid the blame for aggression on Bosnia’s 
Serbs and Croats. Those commentators and scholars who embrace this 
interpretation blame Yugoslavia’s collapse on Croatian and Serbian 
nationalists and usually subscribe to the theory that the meeting between 
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Franjo Tuman and Slobodan Miloevi at Karaorevo in March 1991 
caused and determined the course of Yugoslavia’s wars7 
Burg and Shoup stake out a middle ground by asserting that the region 
was a “segmented society” which functioned despite its “violent history” 
and became unstable once its Yugoslav “civic culture” disappeared.8 Their 
position echoes the argument made by a number of writers, including 
Bogdan Denitch, who asserted that Bosnia, like Yugoslavia, had been 
evolving toward a synthetic “Yugoslav” nationality.9 Such positions 
were usually adopted to rationalize the actions of one of the actors or to 
argue that the real problem was nationalism per se, not a particular 
variant. Variations on this theme included polemical arguments that some 
small nations are not viable, that some nationalisms are inherently 
democratic (Serbian) and others basically fascist (Croatian), and that 
nations experiencing civil strife had “failed” and needed to be treated as 
colonial subjects.10 
None of these interpretations is entirely convincing. There were 
indications that some individuals and groups were moving toward a 
Yugoslav identity and that past differences based on national identity had 
been eroded, but there was also evidence that national identity remained 
strong and continued to determine social status, political access, and 
economic well-being for both individuals and groups.11 Those who 
considered nationalism an archaic remnant of a pre-postmodern world 
ignored such realities or distinguished “good” (“Bosnian”) from “bad” 
(Croatian or Serbian) nationalism. Tanovi-Miller was typical in this 
respect, blaming Croatian and Serbian nationalists for all of Bosnia’s 
problems but viewing Alija Izetbegovi and the SDA as guilty only of the 
venial sin of naiveté. She insists that, unlike the Croatian government, the 
Bosnian government had not “provoked” its Serbs; problems arose only as 
a result of “myths and brainwashing” by Serbian and Croatian 
nationalists.12 Perhaps, but Tanovi-Miller was a member of a small, 
cosmopolitan elite, not unlike intellectuals in every country; there is little 
evidence most Bosnians were so open-minded. 
Those who believed that Bosnia’s nationalities were merging into a 
“Yugoslav” nationality present little but anecdotal evidence and a slight 
increase in the absolute number of “Yugoslavs” in the census. 
Historically, the effort to create “Yugoslavs” did not fare well. King 
Alexander, who dominated Yugoslav politics from its creation in 1918 
until his assassination in 1934, failed to impose a Yugoslav identity on his 
subjects in the early 1930s, and at the VIII Party Congress in 1964, Tito 
chided those who “confuse the unity of nations with the liquidation of 
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nations.” He compared efforts to create an “integral Yugoslav nation” to 
forced “assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, to unitarism and 
hegemony.” The SKJ (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije), he declared, should 
promote the “flowering of all our national cultures” rather than 
“bourgeois” or “bureaucratic” nationalism disguised as Yugoslavism.13 
Although the Yugoslav republics became nationalist weed-beds after 
Tito’s death, many observers continued to insist that Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was a viable multinational state.14 
There was also a tendency after 1991 to accept the definition of 
Muslims as a separate nationality by those who had previously 
questioned the legitimacy of such a definition and discerned dangers 
associated with the creation of a Muslim nation. Yet so long as Muslims 
were not “a separate nationality,” they were under pressure to opt for a 
Croatian or a Serbian nationality, as Croatian and Serbian nationalists, 
both bourgeois and socialist, contested control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 
1969, two years before they officially achieved national status, Wayne 
Vucinich saw Muslims as “something approximating a nation,” noting 
that to define them as such was one way out of the conundrum created 
when the SKJ rejected a “Yugoslav” nationality.15 But defining Muslim as 
a “national” category just transferred the struggle for Bosnia from Serbia 
and Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the three nationalities vied for 
control after 1971, two with backing from the governments of other 
republics, the third with the support of coreligionists in Yugoslavia. To 
declare Muslims a nationality merely complicated the problem because 
national identity continued to define one’s place socially, economically, 
politically and territorially. 
Given such conundrums and such conflicting evidence, it is probably 
prudent to conclude that the wars on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia were not caused by “ancient hatreds” but also that the 
“ethnic” polarization evident in the early 1990s was not merely the result 
of recent events, but of long-term historical and cultural developments 
which contributed to the polarization and mutual distrust of Bosnia’s 
three constituent peoples. Certainly, World War II,16 as Serbian spokesmen 
insisted, was one of these events, but so too were the creation of 
Yugoslavia in 1918,17 the interwar period,18 Alexander’s short-lived 
dictatorship,19 the “Croatian Spring,”20 and the failure to restructure the 
Yugoslav state in 1991.21 Viewing Bosnia’s collapse as a complex event 
which was shaped by multiple forces might not satisfy those who prefer 
simple explanations derived from models of ideal philosophical positions, 
but it seems the most realistic approach to the events of the early 1990s. 
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R E A L I T I E S  
For five centuries, Bosnia was the buffer zone between Croatia and 
Serbia, and for a century its peoples and territories were contested by 
Croatian and Serbian nationalists. By 1990, Branka Maga believed its 
best hope lay in the resurrection of the “traditional coalition” of Muslims 
and Croats, hardly an encouraging prognosis, since it presupposed ethnic 
polarization as a given.22 
There was a culture of tolerance and diversity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
rooted in the millet system and idealized in the concepts of jugoslavenstvo 
(Yugoslavism) and bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity). But this 
culture was severely circumscribed and appears to have existed primarily 
in large urban areas. Bosnians of different religions may have on occasion 
shared the same zadruga and lived in the same villages, but they lived their 
lives apart and nursed images of each other as essentially different.23f not 
as bleak as Ivo Andri’s vision24 the dominant culture in provincial 
towns and villages tended to be segregated and parochial. Urban culture 
may have promoted ethnic integration, particularly among elites, but rural 
culture provided fertile ground for demagogues and ethnic conflict.25 
Scholars have tended to list only Serbs and Croats among the 
demagogues, but Muslim leaders also appealed to ethnic and religious 
identity as preceding or identical with allegiance to Bosnia.26 Neither 
position was conducive to cooperation with the republic’s Serbs and 
Croats. Ante Prkacin, a Bosnian Croat critical of Croatian policy, 
recalled that if Muslims and Croatians had not been hostile to one another 
before the war, neither were their relations “warm” [srdani].27 Ivan 
Lovrenovi, born in Croatia and raised in Bosnia, left the Sarajevo 
suburb of Grbavica because he feared Serb nationalists; two years later, a 
refugee in Sarajevo, he fled to Zagreb.28 By August 1993, Gojko Beri, a 
Muslim reporter for the Sarajevo newspaper Osloboenje, was certain 
that “everyone hates everyone.”29 Certainly, Mehmed Alagi, the 
commander of the Muslim Third Corps in Central Bosnia, distrusted and 
disliked Croats, even as allies.30 
Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, claimed 
that Bosnia’s Serbs “had an understandable grievance” and truly feared a 
“Muslim-dominated state,” and he suggested that Alija Izetbegovi was a 
dangerous, if neurotic, Muslim fundamentalist31 Other authors, primarily 
Serbian, argued that the emergence of radical Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
posed a danger to the region’s non-Muslims.32 Like Bosnia’s Serbs, its 
Croats were concerned that the disparity between Muslim and Christian 
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fertility rates would give the former a majority within a generation. They 
were also upset that Alija Izetbegovi
 negotiated with Serbian, not 
Croatian leaders33 and angered by the SDA leader’s apparently 
dismissive attitude toward the war in Croatia, even as Serbian forces 
used Bosnian territory as a staging and transit area for attacks on 
Croatia.34 But commentators ignored or dismissed Croatian concerns as 
the product of nationalist bias, especially after Croatian proposals that a 
“humane” transfer of population might help avert war.35 Serbian 
concerns, particularly after the occupation of a quarter of Croatia by the 
JNA and Serbian irregulars, were also dismissed. But if they reflected 
nationalist biases, their concerns were not baseless.36 
Writing on the eve of the war, John Allcock, who later testified for the 
prosecution at the ICTY in The Hague, cautioned that the consequences 
would be serious should Yugoslavia’s Muslims “strive to reintegrate their 
broader cultural identity with Islam.”37 David Rieff, whose sympathies
lay with Bosnia’s Muslims, concluded that prior to 1992, SDA leaders, 
including Alija Izetbegovi
 and Haris Silajdi
, were not committed to the 
ideals of multiculturalism.38 Adil Zulfikarpai
 broke with Izetbegovi
 
and formed his own party because the SDA had become too religiously 
oriented, as did Fikret Abdi
, who received more votes for the Presidency 
than the SDA leader.39 But if he espoused liberal principles, Zulfikarpai
 
also distrusted the West. While he considered Croats to be “natural 
allies” against the Serbs, as Westerners he saw them as potential enemies. 
Critical of Izetbegovi
’s passive and accommodating policy toward the 
JNA and the Bosnian SDS, Zulfikarpai
 still considered the SDA leader a 
politician who kept his options open, including the inclusion of an 
autonomous Bosnia in a rump Yugoslavia.40 
So Izetbegovi
 appears not to have been a passive victim of shrewd 
and unscrupulous Croatian and Serbian politicians. As early as 1986, he 
had met with Dobria 	osi
 and other Serbs to discuss a Yugoslavia 
without Croats, and in March 1991, he rejected a proposal from Franjo 
Tuman and Milan Kuan to reorganize Yugoslavia as a confederation.41 
In June, Muhamed Filipovi
 alarmed Muslims when he told the Serbian 
magazine, Vreme, that Tuman had agreed to divide Bosnia with 
Miloevi
, and as the JNA and Serbian forces attacked Croatia from bases 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the summer, Izetbegovi
 negotiated 
with Karadi
 and Miloevi
. Zulfikarpai
 recalled the talks with the 
Serbs as “a sensation,” openly discussed in the media and condemned by 
Bosnia’s Croats, who saw themselves paying the cost of a Muslim-Serb 
alliance.42 Izetbegovi
’s actions led Franjo Tuman to insist that the SDA 
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leader bore much of the blame for Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the Serbian 
attack on Croatia, and the war in Bosnia.43 
By mid-1991, ethnic polarization in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
complete. Izetbegovic had ensured a stalemate by refusing to support Croat 
and Slovene proposals for a confederation and instead talking to Serbs 
and Montenegrins. Bosnia’s Serbs had set up their SARs and threatened to 
secede should the government in Sarajevo declare independence; the Croats 
had contingency plans should Bosnia fall apart; and the Muslims, like the 
Croats and Serbs, were preparing maps of their ideal Bosnia.44 There was 
little likelihood that the traditional Croat-Muslim alliance would be 
resurrected. Nor was this surprising, since the alliance had always been 
something of a myth. 
 
N A R R A T I V E S  
Prior to 1878, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a military frontier with a feudal 
structure, its 39 hereditary fiefs a mirror image of the Military Frontier in 
Croatia-Slavonia. During the 1850s, as the old system of ziamets and 
timars degenerated, the economic obligations of Bosnia’s peasantry 
increased and their personal security and independence declined. 
Conservative and autocratic, Bosnia’s Muslim elite were anti-Western 
and hostile toward reforms coming from Istanbul. Following resistance to 
reform by Bosnia’s Muslim landlords, who imposed an increasingly 
onerous regime on the region’s serfs, Bosnia’s Christians first appealed to 
foreign governments for protection, then revolted in 1875, giving Austria a 
pretext to intervene and occupy the region.45 
Austrian occupation relieved the worst abuses of the Ottoman system, 
but the Austrians preserved the existing order, which favored Muslim 
landlords, not Christian serfs. Like Belgrade in 1971, Vienna sought to 
parry claims by Croat and Serb nationalists by creating a new Bonjak 
nationality based on the region’s Muslims. Austrian policies thus 
strengthened the link between national and agrarian questions, and they 
kept Bosnia’s ethnic groups apart. When political parties formed, they 
were organized along national and confessional lines, with Orthodox 
Serbs looking to Belgrade and Catholic Croats to Zagreb. When forced to 
choose between a Croatian or a Serbian identity, most educated Muslims, 
repulsed by the anti-Islamic character of Serbian nationalism, opted for a 
Croatian affiliation because at least Croatian nationalists embraced 
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Bosnia’s Muslims as “the purest Croatians.” But most Muslims simply 
took refuge in their religion and their past.46 
Such a history did not create warm feelings among Bosnia’s ethnic 
groups.47 At best, Croats and Serbs competed to claim the region’s Muslims 
as members of their own ethnic group, rather than seeking an alliance of 
equals. At worst, the three groups resorted to violence to claim or hold 
territory. Following the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in 
Sarajevo in 1914, Muslims and Croats attacked Serbian businesses and 
cultural institutions. During the war, Croats and Muslims enjoyed a 
privileged position, but after Serbian forces had occupied Bosnia in 1918, 
Serbs attacked Muslims, both landlords and small holders, many of whom 
fled to Turkey. Those who stayed behind organized the JMO to defend all 
Muslims, regardless of class.48 
Islam had become a marker for nationality, to the disappointment of 
Stjepan Radi and other Croatian politicians. Like Franjo Tuman a half 
century later,49 Radi believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would gravitate 
to Croatia and Slovenia. During the Paris Peace Conference he had 
requested the right to self-determination for Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Bosnia. He considered most Muslims to be ethnic Croatians and counted 
JMO deputies as if they were Croatian. In 1920, he hoped Bosnia would 
join Slovenia and Croatia in a “federated peasant republic of 
Yugoslavia.”50 
But this did not happen. Instead, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s peasants were 
disenfranchised, impoverished, and manipulated by appeals to religious 
affiliation. Upper-class Muslims who had welcomed the Serbian army as 
a force which would protect them against the lower classes were quickly 
disabused of their illusions. Within months, Serbian attacks on Muslims 
of all classes and the removal of Muslims and Croats from government 
posts provoked numerous protests by both nationalities. The struggle 
between Muslim landowners and Orthodox peasants took on religious 
and national overtones as the former sought to win the Muslim peasantry 
to their side, arguing that all Muslims must band together to defend 
themselves.  
Land reform eventually dispossessed 4,000 Muslim families and 
benefited 113,103, mostly Christian, families of former serfs and 54,728 
tenant farmers, as well as 13,806 families headed by Serbian veterans 
settled as colonists.51 Serbian paramilitary forces attacked both Muslims 
and Croats, who responded with their own armed formations. By 1919 the 
region appeared to be on the verge of civil war. An official inquiry 
documented fifty attacks on Muslims during a single three-month period, 
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and in October the Croatian Union (Hrvatska Zajednica), a coalition of 
Croatian liberals, and the JMO (Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization/Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija) petitioned the 
central government to restore order.52 
Most Muslim deputies and some Muslim intellectuals declared 
themselves to be “Croatian” or Muslims who spoke “Croatian,” but the 
JMO did not ally itself with Radi’s HSS, and many educated Muslims 
jettisoned their prewar Bonjak identity in favor of Yugoslavism, which 
served as a protective ideological coloration and enabled them, in 
Höpken’s words, to “withdraw into a kind of isolated autarky formed 
around mosque, cultural center, and YMO [JMO].”53 But if Muslims paid 
lip-service to the concept of a unified Yugoslav state, the JMO’s existed to 
defend the rights of Bosnia’s Muslims, and it used Islam, not 
jugoslovenstvo, to mobilize them.54 
Serbian politicians attacked the JMO as a feudal anachronism 
espousing the Koran, but like most parties in the new state, it was linked 
to a particular group identified by confession, location, and ethnicity.55 Its 
leaders asserted a national “individuality” based on religious, historical, 
social, and cultural traditions. They supported “full equality of rights for 
the three peoples” of Bosnia-Herzegovina and evoked jugoslovenstvo to 
demand “equality” (jedinstvenstvo) for Muslims and guarantees for the 
Islamic faith and its institutions. Like the SDA seventy years later, the 
JMO reached out to Muslims throughout Yugoslavia, urging Albanian and 
Turkish Muslims not to emigrate to Turkey and appealing to the Muslims 
in Sandak and Montenegro as “blood of our blood” (krv nae krvi). In 
1923, the party established the cultural organization Narodna Uzdanica to 
reinforce and ensure Muslim solidarity by educating Muslim youth in a 
“true national sense” and promoting pride in Muslim history and 
institutions. Like the HSS, the JMO controlled financial and commercial 
organizations, but unlike the Croatian party, whose anticlerical bias 
prevented it from cooperating with the Catholic Church, the Muslim 
organization was influential in Muslim religious societies. The JMO 
dominated political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina and helped to develop and 
promote a distinctly Muslim consciousness.56 
In 1921, Mehmet Spaho and his party sided with the ruling Serbian 
parties, providing crucial support for the new constitution, but the 
following year, Belgrade jettisoned the JMO in favor of its own creation, 
the JMNO (Jugoslavenska muslimanska narodna organizacija). During the 
1923 campaign, the party again appealed to Islamic solidarity, warning 
that the “existence” (opstanak) of Bosnia’s Muslims was at stake and 
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those who did not vote for them committed an “unpardonable sin before 
God and before the nation, for which posterity would damn them.”57 Few 
Muslims sinned, and the JMO again carried their vote in Bosnia, just as 
the SLS (Slovenska Ludska Stranka) and the HRSS did the Catholic vote in 
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.58 The three parties formed a short-lived 
preani front, but after Radi recognized the regime in 1925, the JMO again 
found itself isolated and under attack from the Serbian press, Serbian and 
Yugoslav paramilitary formations, and the government-supported 
JMNO.59 
In 1926, Belgrade enlisted Muslim youth in the paramilitary formation 
	 , the nom de guerre of the Serbian King, Peter, and the 
following year, it joined Srnao (Srpska nacionalna omladina) in an attempt 
on Spaho’s life. Both groups clashed regularly with JMO members and 
Hanao (Hrvatska narodna omladina), the youth arm of the Croatian Party 
of Rights (HSP, Hrvatska stranka prava). The virulence of the attacks by 
	, Srnao, Orjuna (Organizacija jugoslavenskih omladina), and 
Serbian Chetnik organizations on Muslim, Croatian, and even moderate 
Serbian politicians and organizations made the ethnically mixed areas of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina the sites of the worst political 
violence in interwar Yugoslavia.60 
After a poor showing the elections of 1927, Spaho again joined a 
Serbian-led government, as Svetozar Pribievi took Croatia’s Serbs out 
of the Democratic Party and into a coalition with Stjepan Radi’s Peasant 
Party.61 For the first time, the JMO declared itself a Bosnian, not a Muslim 
or a Yugoslav party. In 1928, although under attack from both Croatian 
and Serbian politicians, the party still polled 97 percent of Bosnia’s 
Muslim vote.62 Following Serbian threats to “amputate” Croatia and 
partition Bosnia-Herzegovina, Radi hoped Bosnia’s Muslims would turn 
toward Croatia, but Spaho chose to collaborate with the government in 
Belgrade and evidently supported the amputation of Croatia in order to 
maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina intact, a choice reminiscent of Izetbegovi’s 
decision to seek an accommodation with Serbia in the summer of 1991.63 
Alexander subsequently banned all ethnic parties, organized a 
Yugoslav party, and split Bosnia-Herzegovina into three banovine, all 
with Serbian majorities, forcing Muslim leaders to use the cultural 
organization Narodna Uzdanica as a political vehicle. Spaho began to 
rebuild the JMO in 1931, briefly supported the opposition, but then joined 
Milan Stojadinovi’s Serbian-dominated government in 1937. 
Stojadinovi recruited Muslims for ministerial posts to give his 
government the appearance of a Yugoslav coalition, and Spaho accepted a 
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vice-presidency in the government-supported JRZ (Jugoslavenska radikalna 
stranka). Stojadinovi moved Belgrade closer to Rome, and he adopted a 
number of fascist trappings, including the use of the term “voa” (Duce/ 
Führer) and a party shirt. In 1938, Spaho opened a JRZ rally in Bijeljina 
by thanking Stojadinovi, “our Leader” (Voa), for having brought 
Yugoslavia peace and stability, but he resigned in February 1939 over the 
creation of a Croatian banovina. 64 
If Spaho and the JMO appear to have been political opportunists, their 
“precarious situation” in interwar Yugoslavia left them few choices. 
Bosnia’s Muslims had been dispossessed, reduced to an impotent minority, 
demeaned and stereotyped as “lazy, fatalistic, and homosexual” Asians, a 
process of dehumanization similar to that suffered by Muslims in Bosnia 
and Kosovo during the early 1990s at the hands of Serbian 
propagandists.65 If threatened by the excesses of Serbian nationalists, 
Muslim leaders cooperated with Serbian politicians in order to 
ameliorate the repression exercised by Belgrade. They were clearly not the 
“natural” allies of the Croats, and while the creation of the Croatian 
Banovina in August 1939 helped to stabilize Croatian-Serbian relations, it 
triggered protests from the JMO, which did not want Bosnia-Herzegovina 
partitioned. But even foreign observers, while acknowledging the plight of 
the Muslims, saw them as either ethnic Serbs or ethnic Croats, and thus 
part of the “Croatian question,” which dominated interwar Yugoslav 
politics.66 Like everyone else, in 1939 the Croatians assumed that 
“Croatian” and “Serbian” Muslims would simply make their peace with 
the partition of Bosnia into Croatian and Serbian areas. 
The JMO was a byproduct of Serbian-Croatian competition and 
rejected the concept of “national unity” (narodno jedinstvo) in favor of a 
pragmatic approach to politics that stressed the need for Muslim unity in 
state dominated by a Serbian elite which had defined Muslims as the 
quintessential “other” from the formation of the Serbian state.67When 
Ante Paveli created his Independent State of Croatia (NDH,Nezavisna 
Drava Hrvatska), he kept the Muslims powerless but gave them a place of 
honor, while Serbian Chetniks tried to destroy them. Consequently, 
Muslims joined the Croatian Army (Domobranstvo) or the German-
sponsored SS Handar Division; few fought with the Partisans, and there 
were none in the Yugoslav government-in-exile.68 
All authors agree that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a killing-field during 
World War II. But because the emphasis is on the Ustaa, not the Chetniks 
or the Partisans, it is not clear from most discussions of World War II that 
the killing was done not only by Croatians serving in Ustaa and 
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Domobran units, but also by Serbs, Muslims, and Partisans of all 
nationalities, as well as by members of the Axis armed forces.69 In June 
1941, Stevan Moljevi, a member of the Executive Council of the Chetnik 
Central National Committee, outlined a plan for an ethnically 
homogeneous Serbia and the expulsion of 2.7 million non-Serbs and the 
settlement of Serbians in areas with mixed populations, as well as in 
Croatian and Muslim areas, including the communities of Gospi, Pakrac, 
Banja Luka, Osijek, Zadar, ibenik, Split, Dubrovnik, and Nova 
Gradi	ka—territories occupied by Serbian forces in 1991 and areas 
which would have stayed in Serbia had Belgrade carried through on its 
threat to “amputate” Croatia in 1928. 
ivko Topalovi, President of the 
Yugoslav National Democratic Union, declared “Anti-Croatianism, anti-
Moslemism, and anti-Yugoslavism” to be “the ideology of the Serbian 
Chetniks,” an ideology tacitly supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church 
and the Yugoslav government-in-exile, which suppressed news of 
atrocities committed by Serbian forces and played up Croatian and 
Muslim collaboration with the Axis.70 
As part of his effort to attract Muslim support, on April 25, 1941, Ante 
Paveli wrote the reis-ul-ulema that he wished “to see Muslims free, equal, 
content, and at home in the free and Independent State of Croatia.” On 
August 14, Dafer Kulenovi and a delegation of JMO leaders met with 
Paveli and declared their support for the new state. Usta	a ideologues 
declared Muslims to be the “purest Croatians” and praised Islam for 
preserving the purest of Croatian bloodlines. The regime also built a 
monumental mosque in Zagreb, disbanded the pro-Serbian cultural 
organization Gajret, and lent its support to Narodna uzdanica, the JMO’s 
cultural arm. A Muslim held the office of Vice-President of the NDH until 
the regime’s collapse in 1945, and Muslims occupied various positions in 
government. But not all Muslims rallied to the NDH, and violence against 
Serbs by both Croatian and Muslim units disillusioned members of the 
Muslim elite, who protested a policy which they saw inciting racial 
hatred and opening Muslims to Serbian retaliation.71 
There are no precise figures regarding how many people died in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, but Bogoljub Koovi and Vladimir 

erjavi have reached a rough consensus. 
erjavi estimates that 316,000 
people perished in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, including 174,000 
civilians (of whom 89,000 died in camps), 70,000 collaborators, and 
72,000 combatants. Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered the highest number and 
the highest percentage of war deaths in Yugoslavia because it hosted the 
most intense and prolonged fighting in a struggle which saw Serbian 
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Chetniks kill Croats and Muslims, Muslim and Croat Ustaa and 
Domobran forces kill Serbs and Partisans, and Partisans kill those who 
collaborated with the Axis, regardless of nationality.72 
The Partisans sought to defuse ethnic competition in Bosnia-
Herzegovina by creating a multinational republic in 1945 and then 
conferring the status of nationality upon Yugoslavia’s Muslims in 1971. 
The new definition of Muslims as a nation elevated them to equal status 
with the region’s Serbs and Croats, encouraged scholarly research, and 
triggered a surge of Muslim nationalism, which included some myth-
making that alarmed both the Yugoslav regime and some Western 
scholars.73 But Bosnia’s history suggested that efforts to impose 
“brotherhood and unity” were unlikely to be more than superficially 
successful, and prior to 1966, rather than equitable treatment for all 
citizens, the regime sought to Serbianize ethnically mixed areas and 
systematically persecuted Croats. The Sarajevo daily 	, whose 
editorial board was dominated by Muslims and Serbs prior to 1989 and 
by the SDA after 1990, was generally hostile to Croatian interests. 
Croatians were under-represented on editorial boards and in the media, 
on the judiciary, and among public prosecutors. Although Croats 
comprised 21.7 percent of the republic’s population, they accounted for 
only 12.7 percent of the membership of the Bosnian Party.74 
By both Serbianizing Bosnia-Herzegovina and creating a Muslim 
nationality, Tito’s regime further divided the republic’s nationalities and 
transferred the struggle for Bosnia from Belgrade and Zagreb to Sarajevo. 
The transformation occurred during a period of history which saw the 
consolidation of Muslim states, the assertion of Palestinian nationalism, 
and the emergence of fundamentalist Islamic movements abroad. The result, 
according to the pro-Serbian writer Nora Beloff, was the penetration of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1970s and early 1980s by an “Islamic 
fundamentalism” which attracted Muslim intellectuals and led to a new 
fascination with Islam. If not “fundamentalism,” certainly a Muslim 
“nationalism” was evident; even Adil Zulfikarpai announced that 
Muslim intellectuals could “go back to their roots and identify with the 
Moslem masses.”75 
Although Wayne Vucinich considered Muslims to have become a 
“problem” by 1969 owing to their anti-Serbian attitudes,76 Beloff’s 
conclusion is overdrawn. Yet it is clear that many of the future leaders of 
the SDA, including Alija Izetbegovi, were influenced by the affirmation of 
a Muslim alternative to the West and that the freedom to be Muslim led 
intellectuals to embrace a Muslim identity. This was certainly true for 
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Muhamed Filipovi, whose reassessment of Marxism cost him his job and 
invited attacks from both Sarajevo’s Osloboenje and Belgrade’s NIN, 
which denounced him as anti-Serbian and pro-Croatian. Like Izetbegovi, 
he was also accused of being a “fundamentalist,” but in the early 1990s, 
he found himself on the outside because he considered the SDA too Islamic. 
He subsequently joined Zulfikarpai to create a liberal, secular, 
“Bosnian” party, which failed to attract even a tenth of the vote.77 
The communist regime had sought to create a “Muslim national 
identity,” not an Islamic revival that would lead Yugoslavia’s Muslims to 
identify with Islam as the basis for a new political order. When Alija 
Izetbegovi suggested that Muslims should work to reshape civil society 
according to Islamic principles because “there is no peace or coexistence 
between the Islamic faith and other non-Islamic social and political 
systems,” the regime put him in jail.78 The dilemma for Muslims was 
suggested by Izetbegovi in an interview in 1994. “By faith,” he said, “we 
are Eastern (istonjaci), by education we are Europeans.” So the heart of 
a Muslim looked East, his mind West, which for those who were honest 
involved a basic question of identity. The ideal resolution to this dilemma, 
he concluded, was to unite the religious and the secular and build a strong 
party. But his declaration a year later that “Free people are in reality the 
slaves of freedom” suggested a less than democratic worldview, nor could 
his declaration that Bosnia was the “promised land” of Muslims have 
reassured Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs.79 
Claims like those put forward by Izetbegovi evoked images of an 
Islamic republic and conjured up the stereotype of the Muslim as 
fundamentalist, leading the Croatian economist, Branko Horvat, to 
suggested replacing the term “Muslim” with “Bosnian” to avoid adding to 
inter-ethnic tension in Bosnia. But neither Croats nor Serbs were 
comfortable redefining themselves only as Bosnians, and both groups 
rejected the use of the term for the republic’s Muslims because it would 
have effectively identified them with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question of 
Muslim identity, as Sabrina Ramet has explained, was vexed. Some 
Muslims viewed themselves as “Muslim Croats” or “Muslim Serbs, others 
as “Bosnian Muslims” or simply “Muslims.” A small minority identified 
themselves as “atheist Muslims” or “Yugoslavs.”80 But if Muslim identity 
was a vexed question, so was the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there 
was no more consensus among Muslims about how to resolve it than there 
was among Croats and Serbs.81 
But there was a consensus of sorts during the 1990 elections. The three 
“national” parties took 85.1 percent of the vote, confirming a high degree 
spacesofidentity 5.1 (2005)   39 
 
of ethnic polarization in the republic: the SDA won 35.8 percent and 86 
seats in Parliament; the SDS 30.5 percent and 72 seats; and the HDZ 18.3 
percent and 44 seats. Only the HDZ appears to have had some 
transnational appeal, given that the Muslim and Serbian parties fell short 
of their relative percentage of the population, but the Croatian party won 
roughly a percentage point more, representing about 40,000 Bosnians.8 2 
But with 44 seats, the HDZ could not control the government in Sarajevo, 
nor could the SDA with 86. They faced a similar dilemma to that which 
they had encountered when Yugoslavia was originally formed. Like the 
HSS, the HDZ could ally itself with one of the larger parties or remain 
isolated and impotent. So the pattern of interwar Bosnian elections and 
politics was repeated in 1990. 
The relative percentages of population were also similar to those in 
the 1920s and 1930s, but this time it was the Muslims, not the Serbs, who 
held the plurality. When Izetbegovic and SDA leaders demanded a 
majoritarian political system, they were ignoring the outcome of the 1990 
elections. Bosnians had voted as members of groups, not as individuals. A 
majoritarian system can only work in polities that do not practice ethnic 
politics, where people vote as individuals, not as groups. When Muslims 
began to identify Bosnia-Herzegovina as “their state,” Bosnia’s Croats 
became alarmed.83 Because their experience in Yugoslavia had been so 
bitterly disappointing, Bosnia’s Croats opposed the creation of a unitary 
Bosnian state which seemed a miniature of the old Yugoslavia, complete 
with a hegemonic plurality. The Muslims, who were already 44% of the 
population and had the highest birth rate in the republic. Given 
Izetbegovi’s earlier writings and the Muslim nature of the SDA, a certain 
amount of unease among the Croats was to be expected, especially since, as 
David Rieff noted, the SDA had not been “as committed as it should have 
been to a multicultural Bosnia” until the war forced it to be. Even then, the 
party had its “fundamentalists” and “young fanatics who insisted on 
saying ‘Es-salaam aleikum’ instead of ‘dobar dan’ (good day), and 
proclaiming themselves mujahedin....”84 
It seems clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a multicultural 
paradise prior to 1991, nor after. It was a battleground on which party 
leaders mobilized their co-nationalists, alliances constantly shifted, and 
each nationality pursued its own interests and illusions. Bosnia’s history 
made mistrust of other nationalities prudent, and it was not surprising 
that its peoples distrusted one another in 1991. What is surprising is that 
Western scholars who knew better jettisoned history in favor of an ideal 
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vision of Yugoslavia and Bosnia, a vision which distorted current 
realities and precluded an informed policy. 
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